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WHO GETS THE FROZEN EMBRYOS DURING A DIVORCE? A CASE 
FOR THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT APPROACH 
Sarah B. Kirschbaum* 
The increase in the use and success of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology has come with an increase in legal and ethical dilemmas 
facing courts and prospective parents. In particular, courts in the 
past 25 years have grappled with the issue of frozen embryo 
disposition during a divorce proceeding. Most couples sign some 
form of contract before freezing their embryos. Many state courts, 
however, interpret and enforce these contracts differently than they 
do other contracts. While approaches to in vitro fertilization 
contract interpretation and enforcement already exist in some 
states, many states have yet to decide what will happen if a frozen 
embryo dispute arises. This Recent Development proposes a 
solution that respects the principles of contract law while still 
protecting the competing interests of the parties involved. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) has rapidly 
expanded in ways that many courts are continuing to wrestle. While 
the media mostly covers the highly sensational disputes between 
couples and in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) clinics,1 a more common 
IVF dispute is occurring all over America: the dispute over frozen 
embryos during a divorce proceeding. Some states have addressed 
through case law or statute what will happen during a frozen embryo 
disposition dispute. These states, however, overwhelmingly favor 
methods of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement that do not 
protect the highly personal, competing interests of couples during a 
dispute.2 Additionally, many states have yet to address the issue at 
 
 1 NJ couple sues fertility clinic, saying wrong sperm used to conceive child, 
ABC7 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://abc7ny.com/society/couple-says-fertility-clinic-
used-wrong-sperm-to-conceive-baby/5532537 [https://perma.cc/2TWH-D2S4]; 
see also Isaac Stanley-Becker, She gave birth to twins through IVF. But the babies 
weren’t hers, a lawsuit alleges, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/08/twins-ivf-birth-lawsuit/ 
[https://perma.cc/SX6R-C454]. 
 2 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018) (adopting the 
Pure Contractual Approach); Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2019) 
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all. This lack of clarity and uniformity leaves couples pursuing IVF 
vulnerable and subject to significant uncertainty regarding the 
disposition of their frozen embryos, even when they sign contracts. 
This lack of uniformity persisting in frozen embryo law 
impacted Modern Family star Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé Nick 
Loeb in 2015.3 After calling off their engagement, Vergara and Loeb 
began a contentious two-year dispute over their frozen embryos 
created while the two were still together.4 Vergara was certain she 
wanted to keep the embryos frozen while Loeb wanted to implant 
the embryos into a surrogate.5 Over the two-year dispute, the couple 
spent thousands of dollars and litigated in multiple states over the 
disposition of their frozen embryos.6 Because of the legal gray areas 
that persist in frozen embryo disputes, Loeb attempted to move the 
proceeding from state to state to increase the likelihood of obtaining 
the outcome he wanted.7 Although this celebrity legal battle (like 
many celebrity lawsuits) may seem far removed from any legal 
battle a typical couple may encounter, disputes over frozen embryo 
disposition are a reality that many Americans face.8 
Participation in ART is increasing in the United States.9 
Between the years 1987 and 2015, ART contributed to the birth of 
more than 1 million babies.10 Couples choose to expand their 
 
(adopting the Pure Contractual Approach); Bilbao v. Goodwin, No. 20078, 2019 
WL 5607809 (Conn. Nov. 5, 2019) (adopting the Pure Contractual Approach). 
 3 Anna Almendrala, What Sofia Vergara’s Case Reveals About IVF’s Legal 
Gray Areas, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2016) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
avoid-custody-battle-over-frozen-embryos_n_584a03dfe4b0bd9c3dfc1a8f 
[https://perma.cc/XX5V-NG8H]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2016 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT (Oct. 2018), 
https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2016-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PX5-9GW7]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 IVF by the Numbers, PENN MEDICINE (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.pennmedicine.org/updates/blogs/fertility-blog/2018/march/ivf-by-
the-numbers [https://perma.cc/7U64-9ZHR]. 
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families through ART for a number of reasons.11 ART is available 
for older couples, infertile couples, and same-sex couples when they 
may otherwise be unable to conceive through natural means.12 
While ART has had a positive impact in the lives of thousands 
of couples, the increased use of this technology has come with 
significant legal and ethical implications. Particularly, courts have 
struggled with the disposition of frozen embryos during divorce 
proceedings.13 Today, before embarking on their IVF journeys, 
couples usually sign contracts drafted by an attorney or supplied as 
a part of the IVF clinic consent form that address what will happen 
to the frozen embryos in the event of a divorce.14 Typically, an IVF 
contract states the parties’ intent for the disposition of the frozen 
embryos in the event of the divorce, and requires both parties to sign 
the contract before proceeding with any IVF-related procedures. In 
the event of a divorce, most states allow parties to donate their 
embryos to research, donate the embryos to another infertile couple, 
award the embryos to one of the biological parents, discard the 
embryos, or keep the embryos frozen indefinitely.15 
Unfortunately, courts that have addressed frozen embryo 
disposition have struggled to remain uniform in their methods of 
IVF contract interpretation and enforcement.16 In states that have 
addressed frozen embryo disposition, three different approaches 
have emerged: the Pure Contractual Approach, the Balancing Test 
 
 11 Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/ 
infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization#1 
[https://perma.cc/Z8TD-KEFH] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Anna El-Zein, Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to Frozen Embryo 
Disputes, 82 MO. L. REV. 881, 884 (2017); see also Tracy J. Frazier, Of Property 
and Procreation: Oregon’s Place in the National Debate Over Frozen Embryo 
Disputes, 88 OR. L. REV. 931, 932 (2009). 
 14 See Gwen Mayes, “Wait a Minute, I’ve Changed My Mind”—Finding the 
Right Time to Determine the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, MEDSCAPE (July 25, 
2005), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/508555  [https://perma.cc/ 
K53T-HP62] (“One important legacy of Davis v. Davis is the incorporation of 
written agreements and consent processes from the beginning of IVF treatments 
that spell out what will happen should a couple, at a later point, disagree on the 
disposition of unused embryos.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 El-Zein, supra note 13, at 884; see also Frazier, supra note 13, at 932. 
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Approach, and the Contemporaneous Consent Approach.17 
Additionally, many courts have not yet addressed the issue at all.18 
The lack of an established approach in those states leaves couples 
vulnerable because it is unclear how their contracts will be 
interpreted or enforced if a dispute arises. Courts may choose to 
follow one of the existing approaches—which do not always result 
in the same outcome for the embryos—or those courts may choose 
to adopt a novel approach. 
The Contemporaneous Consent Approach, originally proposed 
by Carl Coleman in a 1999 law review article,19 has been 
implemented in a few courts,20 and should be adopted in the 
remaining states still looking for guidance. The Contemporaneous 
Consent Approach enforces IVF contracts generally unless a party 
has a change of heart regarding the disposition of the embryos at the 
time of enforcement.21 In other words, under this approach, IVF 
contracts are enforceable if a dispute arises between the couple that 
does not address embryo disposition or if a dispute arises between 
the IVF clinic and the couple.22 However, if a party has a change of 
heart regarding the disposition of the embryos at the time of 
enforcement, the contract will no longer be enforceable.23 At that 
point, the embryos must remain frozen until the parties can come to 
a mutual agreement.24 Thus, with the Contemporaneous Consent 
 
 17 El-Zein, supra note 13, at 884. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An 
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 
88–89 (1999). 
 20 See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2016). 
 21 Coleman, supra note 19, at 110. 
 22 See Coleman, supra note 19, at 89; see also Marisa G. Zizzi, The Preembryo 
Prenup: A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute Adopting a Contractual Approach to 
Resolving Disputes Concerning the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER 
L.J. 391, 406 (2012). 
 23 Coleman, supra note 19, at 112. 
 24 Id. 
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Approach, a court will only enforce a contemporaneous decision 
between the couple.25 
This Recent Development proposes the Contemporaneous 
Consent Approach as the appropriate method of IVF contract 
interpretation and enforcement and explains why this approach 
protects the interests of couples more than any other approach that 
has been applied in courts thus far. Currently, many states have no 
case law or statutes addressing the enforceability of contracts 
dealing with the disposition of frozen embryos.26 This lack of clarity 
and uniformity in the law leaves couples pursuing IVF vulnerable, 
even if they address all issues through a contract because it is 
uncertain how courts will interpret the contract or if courts will 
enforce the contract at all. Ultimately, understanding how courts 
will interpret and enforce IVF contracts will help drafters create 
more comprehensive and protective IVF contracts. Having this 
understanding will also provide prospective parents with assurance 
when embarking on their IVF journeys that their intentions for the 
disposition of their embryos at the time of enforcement will be 
respected if a dispute arises. 
Part II of this Recent Development introduces Assisted 
Reproductive Technology generally and explains the process of IVF 
and cryopreservation.27 Part III introduces the three main approaches 
courts have implemented when interpreting and enforcing IVF 
contracts. Part IV introduces the statutory approaches in Louisiana 
and Florida for addressing the disposition of frozen embryos. Part V 
establishes why the Contemporaneous Consent Approach should be 
adopted by courts still looking for guidance during frozen embryo 
disputes. Finally, Part VI addresses some of the drawbacks of the 
approach and proposes potential solutions. 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 See infra Appendix A. 
 27 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 533 
(Cryopreservation is “the practice of freezing eggs or embryos from a patient’s 
ART cycle for potential future use.”). 
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II. THE TECHNOLOGY: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY, IVF, AND CRYOPRESERVATION 
Assisted Reproductive Technology is used to describe any and 
all technology involving embryos and eggs used to facilitate a 
pregnancy.28 The term “embryo” is used from “the moment cells 
divide after fertilization until the eighth week of pregnancy.”29 There 
are multiple methods of ART involving embryos, but ART is 
generally the process of “surgically removing eggs from a woman’s 
ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning 
them to a female patient or gestational carrier or donating them to 
another patient.”30 
The three most common forms of ART are gamete intrafallopian 
transfer, which “involves using a fiber optic instrument called a 
laparoscope to guide the transfer of unfertilized eggs and sperm 
(‘gametes’) into a woman’s fallopian tubes through small incisions 
in her abdomen,”31 zygote intrafallopian transfer which involves 
fertilizing a woman’s eggs in the laboratory and then using a 
laparoscope to guide the transfer of the fertilized eggs (“zygotes”) 
into a woman’s fallopian tubes,32 and finally, IVF.33 IVF is by far 
the most common form of ART.34 Other forms of ART exist beyond 
the procedures previously described, but they are rarely 
implemented.35 
IVF involves removing a woman’s eggs through an egg retrieval 
surgical procedure, fertilizing the eggs in a laboratory, and then 
 
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 Jon Johnson, Embryo freezing: What you need to know, MEDICAL NEWS 
TODAY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/ 
314662.php [https://perma.cc/733X-TSJ2]. 
 30 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 3. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 536. 
 33 Johnson, supra note 29; see also Christina L. Preville, Collaborative Law in 
Pennsylvania and the Frozen Embryo Debate, 8 J. OF ENVTL. AND PUB. HEALTH 
L. 80, 84 (2013) (“The Society for Assisted Reproductive Treatment found that 
99%% of ART procedures are IVF.”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 4. 
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transferring the resulting embryos into the uterus of the female.36 For 
more complicated IVF procedures, “fertilization involves a 
specialized technique known as intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
(ICSI). In ICSI, a single sperm is injected directly into a woman’s 
egg.”37 The embryos created through any method of IVF can either 
be implanted in the woman immediately or can be frozen for later 
use through a process known as cryopreservation.38 
Cryopreservation is “the practice of freezing eggs or embryos 
from a patient’s ART cycle for potential future use.”39 The process 
involves replacing the water from inside the cells of the embryo with 
a material called the cryoprotectant.40 Once the water is removed, 
the embryos are chilled to their “preservation state” at which point 
the embryos reach a temperature at which they will not deteriorate.41 
At this point, the embryos are frozen, and then stored in liquid 
nitrogen at temperatures around -321ºF.42 
 
 36 Johnson, supra note 29; see also 1 Lloyd T. Kelso, N.C. Family Law Practice 
§ 9:4 (2017). 
 37 Johnson, supra note 29. See also In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC, 
(June 22, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-
fertilization/about/pac-20384716 [https://perma.cc/T8JE-GPU2]. 
 38 Johnson, supra note 29; see also In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37. 
 39 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 533. (“An 
ART cycle starts when a woman begins taking fertility drugs or having her ovaries 
monitored for follicle production. If eggs are produced, the cycle progresses to 
egg retrieval. Retrieved eggs are combined with sperm to create embryos. If 
fertilization is successful, at least one embryo is selected for transfer. If 
implantation occurs, the cycle may progress to clinical pregnancy and possibly 
live birth. ART cycles include any process in which (1) an ART procedure is 
performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian stimulation or monitoring with 
the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos have been thawed 
with the intent of transferring them to a woman.”). 
 40 Id.; William C. Shiel, Medical Definition of Cryoprotectant, MEDICINENET, 
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7253 
[https://perma.cc/WJQ7-833F] (“A chemical component of a freezing solution 
used in cryopreservation to help protect what is being frozen from freeze damage. 
The chemical glycerol, for example, is commonly used as a cryoprotectant to 
protect frozen red blood cells.”). 
 41 Johnson, supra note 29. 
 42 Id. 
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According to physicians, there is no limit to the length of time 
an embryo can remain frozen.43 There is ample evidence of 
successful pregnancies from frozen embryos stored for up to ten 
years.44 It is worth noting, however, that IVF and cryopreservation 
are relatively modern reproductive technologies, and researchers 
have not yet completed long-term studies on the outcomes of 
embryos that have been frozen for extended lengths of time.45 
Couples choose to freeze their embryos for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, cryopreservation makes IVF less expensive for 
the couple and less invasive for the woman.46 The IVF egg retrieval 
procedure can be quite costly. One egg retrieval procedure could 
cost upwards of $10,000.47 The hormones used before the egg 
retrieval procedure may cost an additional $3,000 to $5,000.48 
Furthermore, the surgical egg removal process is often taxing on 
a woman physically.49 The process includes ovulation induction, 
which requires the woman to go through multiple synthetic hormone 
treatments and the egg retrieval surgical procedure, which requires 
sedation and could lead to cramping and pain during and after the 
procedure.50 So, to ensure a higher IVF success rate and fewer egg 
retrievals, many more eggs are removed during the first egg retrieval 
procedure to reduce the need for multiple procedures.51 Because it is 
unclear which embryos will be viable, more embryos are created and 
frozen than would be intended for actual implantation.52 In addition, 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37. 
 47 Sarah McHaney & Rebecca Jacobson, 7 things every woman should know 
before freezing her eggs, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/freeze-eggs [https://perma.cc/8RHP-
NLGN]. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Mayes, supra note 14. For a more in-depth argument on how and why women 
contribute more to the IVF process, see Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen 
Preembryos & The “Right Not to Be a Parent,” 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128 
(2003). 
 50 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 37. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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married couples may choose to freeze their embryos because there 
is some literature suggesting frozen embryos are more viable than 
freezing eggs and sperm separately for future use.53 
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO IVF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Generally, IVF contracts addressing the disposition of frozen 
embryos exist in two forms: a contract is either drafted by an 
attorney or it is provided through the IVF clinic consent form.54 Both 
methods of IVF contracting typically address what will happen to 
the embryos in the event of a divorce. Regardless of the method a 
couple uses to enter into a contract before embarking on IVF,55 most 
couples have some written documentation signed by both parties 
addressing the disposition of the embryos in the event of a divorce.56 
Frozen embryo disputes arise in courts when, at the time of 
enforcement of the contract (i.e. the divorce), parties do not agree 
on the disposition of the frozen embryos. Literature in this area has 
classified the various methods of interpretation and enforcement of 
IVF contracts during disputes into three approaches: the Pure 
Contractual Approach, the Balancing Test Approach, and the 
Contemporaneous Consent Approach.57 
To better illustrate how each approach differs from the others, 
imagine the following hypothetical scenario: Bob and Jane Doe start 
the process of IVF because Bob is about to begin chemotherapy 
which may result in his infertility. Because of Bob’s potential 
 
 53 McHaney & Jacobson, supra note 47. 
 54 See Deborah L. Foreman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic 
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 57, 59 
(2011). 
 55 For a more in-depth analysis on the difference between the two forms of IVF 
contracts, see generally id. 
 56 See Frazier, supra note 13, at 904. Florida has even enacted a statute requiring 
couples to sign written agreements before beginning IVF, see FLA. STAT. § 742.17 
(2019). 
 57 Melissa Boatman, Comments: Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an 
Equitable Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes after Divorce, 37 
U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 288–99 (2008). For a visual depiction of which states 
follow each judicial approach and which states have yet to determine an approach, 
see infra Appendix A. 
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infertility, the couple signs an IVF contract awarding the frozen 
embryos to Bob in the event of a divorce. Years pass and Bob is in 
fact infertile now. The couple files for divorce, but Jane has had a 
change of heart and no longer wants Bob to have the embryos 
because she does not want to become a biological parent. She now 
wishes for the embryos to be destroyed. Bob, however, still wants 
use of the embryos. 
The following subsections will briefly introduce each IVF 
contract interpretation and enforcement approach, give an example 
of an impactful case from a state implementing that particular 
approach, and then demonstrate how a court employing each 
approach would interpret and enforce Bob and Jane Doe’s 
hypothetical IVF contract. 
A. Pure Contractual Approach 
First, the most common approach of IVF contract interpretation 
and enforcement is the Pure Contractual Approach.58 Courts 
implementing the Pure Contractual Approach treat IVF contracts the 
same as any other type of contract.59 IVF contract interpretation and 
enforcement follows the same principles of general contract law, 
such as the requirement of mutual assent at the time of the 
agreement, with no specialized rules applied in the event a dispute 
arises.60 The rationale behind this method is that competent adults 
are free to contract, and their intent at the time of the contract should 
be enforced as in other types of contracts.61 The same safeguards, 
thresholds, and defenses available in any other contract dispute are 
available in IVF contracts under this method of IVF contract 
interpretation and enforcement.62 Furthermore, this approach 
maintains the notion that there is nothing inherently different about 
IVF contracts than any other form of contract, thus not utilizing any 
specialized rules for interpretation or enforcement. 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 El-Zein, supra note 13, at 886; see also Frazier, supra note 13, at 941. 
 60 El-Zein, supra note 13, at 886. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Frazier, supra note 13, at 941. 
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New York has followed the Pure Contractual Approach since 
1998. In Kass v. Kass,63 the court was faced with a dispute over 
frozen embryos during a divorce proceeding.64 Maureen Kass and 
Stephen Kass signed an IVF agreement that stated their frozen 
embryos would be donated to research in the event of a divorce.65 At 
the time of the divorce, however, Maureen had a change of heart.66 
Maureen wanted to use the embryos.67 Steven, however, refused this 
idea because he did not want parentage forced onto him.68 The New 
York Court of Appeals held that the IVF agreement the couple 
signed was enforceable despite Maureen’s change of heart.69 In 
accordance with standard New York contract law, the court held that 
the agreement “unequivocally manifest[ed] their mutual intention” 
at the time of execution.70 Therefore, the embryos were donated to 
research as established by the original contract despite Maureen’s 
changed desires.71 
Using the Pure Contractual Approach, a court is likely to enforce 
Bob and Jane Doe’s hypothetical IVF contract discussed above and 
award the embryos to Bob, thus ignoring Jane’s change of heart at 
the time of enforcement. Because the Pure Contractual Approach 
aligns with all of the basic principles of contract law, the court would 
be reluctant not to enforce any prior written agreement. In this case, 
the only defense available to Jane would be the contract law public 
policy defense. Jane could try to argue that the contract forces 
parentage upon her which violates public policy. Thus, the contract 
should be void. The success of this public policy argument, 
however, would be determined under the discretion of the court.72 
 
 63 Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. 1998). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 558. 
 66 Id. at 560. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 565. 
 70 Id. at 567. 
 71 Id. 
 72 The uncertainty of the public policy defense as a whole is discussed later in 
Section V. 
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B. Balancing Test Approach 
Second, some states instead follow a Balancing Test Approach 
in which the court may choose to disregard a couple’s previous IVF 
agreement and weigh the competing interests of the parties at the 
time of the divorce to determine the proper disposition of the frozen 
embryos.73 Using this approach, courts may weigh factors such as a 
party’s religion, infertility, and the desire of a party not to become a 
parent.74 In addition, this approach is often employed when no 
frozen embryo agreement exists between the parties at the time of 
divorce.75 
New Jersey has followed the Balancing Test Approach since 
2001. Similar to Kass, in J.B. v. M.B.,76 the court was faced with a 
dispute over frozen embryos during a divorce proceeding.77 The 
parties signed an agreement stating that in the event of a divorce the 
embryos would revert back to the IVF clinic.78 The court first stated 
that New Jersey “evince[s] a policy against enforcing private 
contracts to enter into or terminate family relationships.”79 The court 
then weighed the interests of the wife and husband.80 The wife, 
although infertile, wanted the frozen embryos to be discarded.81 The 
husband, a devout Catholic, wanted the use of the embryos and to 
develop them into children.82 Ultimately, the court held that the 
mother’s right not to bear children was paramount over the father’s 
wish to have the embryos and ordered the embryos to be discarded.83 
Using the Balancing Test Approach, a court would likely not 
recognize Bob and Jane Doe’s prior agreement because of the 
personal, familial nature of the contract. Instead, the court would 
weigh the interests of Bob and Jane at the time of enforcement 
 
 73 Frazier, supra note 13, at 933. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 77 Id. 
 78 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).  
 79 Id. at 717. 
 80 Id. at 719. 
 81 Id. at 710. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 720. 
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against each other to determine what the best outcome should be for 
the frozen embryos. For Bob and Jane, the court would likely weigh 
Bob’s current inability to have a biological child of his own against 
Jane’s desire to not have any biological children with her ex-
husband. Ultimately, the Balancing Test Approach is highly fact 
dependent and how the dispute would come out in this particular 
balancing test is completely determined under the discretion of the 
court. 
C. Contemporaneous Consent Approach 
Finally, the third approach is the Contemporaneous Consent 
Approach. This Recent Development endorses the 
Contemporaneous Consent Approach as the appropriate method of 
IVF contract interpretation and enforcement because the approach 
honors the basic principles of contract law while still protecting 
couples’ competing interests during a dispute. The 
Contemporaneous Consent Approach aligns with the principles of 
contract law but adds an additional safeguard to the process. Using 
this form of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement, courts 
generally enforce an IVF contract absent a change of heart by one 
of the parties at the time of enforcement.84 When a dispute arises, 
the court requires both parties to agree at the time of enforcement 
before any final disposition of the frozen embryos takes place.85 
Until a mutual decision is reached between the parties, the court 
does not make any decisions regarding the frozen embryos—the 
embryos either remain frozen until no longer viable or until storage 
is no longer an option.86 If the parties subsequently come to a mutual 
agreement on their own, the court would enforce that 
contemporaneous agreement.87 Carl Coleman first proposed this 
approach in a law review article in 1999.88 In the article, Coleman 
argues that the Pure Contractual Approach “insufficiently protects 
the individual and societal interests at stake” because there is 
something inherently different and more personal about contracts 
 
 84 Coleman, supra note 19, at 110. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Preville, supra note 33, at 90–91. 
 87 Coleman, supra note 19, at 110. 
 88 Id. 
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for frozen embryo disposition.89 Thus, to protect those individual 
interests, the Contemporaneous Consent Approach provides an 
additional safeguard to the process by requiring both parties to agree 
at the time of enforcement before any final disposition of the frozen 
embryos. 
Massachusetts has implemented the Contemporaneous Consent 
Approach since 2000. Similar to the disputes in the Kass and J.B. 
cases, in A.Z. v. B.Z.,90 the court was faced with a dispute over frozen 
embryos during a divorce proceeding.91 Before beginning the IVF 
process, the couple signed a consent form stating that in the event of 
a divorce, the embryos would be awarded to the wife because she 
was not able to become pregnant through conventional means of 
conception.92 At the time of divorce, however, the husband had a 
change of heart and no longer wished for the wife to be awarded the 
embryos and potentially have parentage forced upon him.93 The 
court held that even if the agreement between the parties was valid, 
the court would not enforce the contract because one of the parties 
had a change of heart.94 The court thus “would not enforce an 
agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against 
his or her will.”95 
Using the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, in the 
hypothetical case of Bob and Jane Doe, the court would not enforce 
their prior agreement. Because Jane had a change of heart regarding 
the disposition of the frozen embryos, the court would order 
indefinite storage until the parties come to a mutual agreement 
regarding the disposition of their frozen embryos. If Bob and Jane 
later come to a mutual agreement, a court would then enforce that 
subsequent contemporaneous agreement. 
 
 89 Id. at 88. 
 90 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 91 Id. at 1051. 
 92 Id. at 1054. 
 93 Id. at 1057. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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IV. STATUTORY APPROACHES 
While most states have chosen to leave the issue of frozen 
embryo disposition to the courts, a handful of states have chosen to 
address this issue through statutes.96 While these laws may be further 
developed and interpreted by courts, the statutes provide parameters 
the courts must use as the starting point in IVF contract 
interpretation and enforcement. Florida and Louisiana are two states 
that have enacted statutes addressing frozen embryo disputes. These 
two statutes embody typical language legislatures adopt in these 
types of laws, but come to very different conclusions on the 
disposition options for frozen embryos. Generally, Florida codifies 
the Pure Contractual Approach, requiring parties to enter into prior 
agreements before beginning IVF,97 while Louisiana provides 
frozen embryos with a legal status by referring to the embryos as 
“juridical person[s].”98 These two states’ statutes demonstrate how 
adopting a statutory scheme to address frozen embryo disposition 
can lead to significantly different outcomes. 
A. Florida’s Approach 
In 1993, Florida enacted a statute addressing the disposition of 
frozen embryos.99 The statute states that parties must enter into a 
written agreement that provides for the disposition of the 
commissioning couples’ eggs, sperm, and preembryos100 in the event 
of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen 
circumstance.101 The statute goes on to explain, in the absence of an 
agreement, the parties providing the egg and sperm have control 
over the embryo and the decision-making resides jointly with the 
couple.102 The statute also states that, in the event of the death of one 
 
 96 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g (2017); FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121–9:133 (2017). 
 97 FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017). 
 98 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2017). 
 99 FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2017). 
 100 Id. § 742.13(12) (“‘Preembryo’ means the product of fertilization of an egg 
by a sperm until the appearance of the embryonic axis.”). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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party, the embryos will go to the surviving party.103 Finally, the 
Florida statute addresses that, if a child is born from an embryo after 
the death of a party, the child will not be able to inherit from the 
deceased party unless the decedent’s will has provided for such an 
occasion.104 This statute suggests that written agreements will be 
enforced while also accounting for what will happen if a dispute 
arises in the absence of a written agreement. 
Despite the breadth of this statute, it leaves its interpretation 
open to Florida courts. While the statute appears to be a codification 
of the Pure Contractual Approach, it still does not speak to how 
agreements will be interpreted or enforced by courts, such as what a 
court should consider to be void because of public policy 
considerations or whether a court would force parentage on a party 
if the contract called for it. 
B. Louisiana’s Approach 
In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute that provided frozen 
embryos with a legal status.105 One of the provisions of this statute 
establishes that a human embryo is a “juridical person which cannot 
be owned by the in vitro patients.”106 In addition, the statute prohibits 
using the embryo for research purposes107 and prohibits destruction 
of the embryos.108 Finally, the statute provides that any disposition 
must pass a “best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum” test before 
any disposition decision is enforced.109 While this statute does not 
provide guidelines on whether a court should enforce an IVF 
contract generally, it does set parameters for IVF contracts as the 
starting point. An IVF contract calling for embryos to be discarded 
or donated to research in the event of divorce would not be enforced 
because it directly contravenes the statute, thus violating public 
policy. 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-9:133 (2017). 
 106 Id. § 9:130. 
 107 Id. § 9:122. 
 108 Id. § 9:129. 
 109 See Kelso, supra note 36. 
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This statute, however, also still leaves much to be determined by 
Louisiana courts. For example, this statute does not speak to whether 
an IVF contract is void on its face because of the nature of the 
agreement even if the agreement does not call for the embryos to be 
discarded or donated to research. 
Although adopting a statute may appear like a simple, 
comprehensive approach to address frozen embryo disposition 
disputes, the Florida and Louisiana statutes evidence how adopting 
a statutory scheme can lead to significantly different outcomes for 
states. Furthermore, statutory schemes still leave much to the 
discretion of the state courts. Such approaches fail to address the 
lack of uniformity in frozen embryo law that persists today. 
V. THE STRENGTHS OF ADOPTING THE CONTEMPORANEOUS 
CONSENT APPROACH 
Although implemented by only a few states,110 and thus highly 
underutilized, the Contemporaneous Consent Approach should be 
adopted in the remaining states looking for guidance on interpreting 
and enforcing IVF contracts. The strengths of this approach are 
abundant: the approach honors many of the principles of contract 
law, thus respecting couples’ rights to contract concerning the 
disposition of their frozen embryos, while providing an additional 
safeguard to the process to ensure all of the interests at stake are 
protected. 
A. Providing an Additional Safeguard to the Pure Contractual 
Approach 
The Contemporaneous Consent Approach aligns with the 
general principles of contract law, such as mutual assent and 
enforcement if valid.111 Parties are able to freely enter into IVF 
agreements and, if no later dispute arises, their intent at the time of 
the contract will be honored by courts.112 With this approach, there 
 
 110 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 
N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016). 
 111 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 112 Id. 
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is no fear that a court would rule the entire agreement void simply 
because of the nature of the agreement as in the Balancing Test 
Approach.113 In addition, treating these contracts as entirely void 
because of the highly personal, private nature of the agreement 
would render any and all IVF contracts futile. Ensuring IVF 
contracts are still valid, absent a change of heart, becomes 
particularly important in two situations: if the creators of the frozen 
embryos get into a dispute, not with each other, but with the IVF 
clinic, or alternatively, if the creators get into a dispute with each 
other, not over the disposition of the embryos, but over some other 
provision in the IVF contract. 
Generally, it is necessary that IVF contracts remain enforceable 
and still governed by contract law because a valid contractual 
relationship should still exist between the couple and the IVF clinic. 
In the event the parties get into a dispute with the IVF clinic, the 
original agreement should still be presumed valid and the terms in 
the contract should be referenced in the dispute.114 
Additionally, disputes regarding the IVF contract may arise 
between the parties that do not deal with the disposition of the frozen 
embryos. For example, a couple could sign an IVF contract that 
states the frozen embryos will remain frozen indefinitely and also 
determines that one of the parties would be solely responsible for 
paying the storage fees in the event of the divorce. At the time of the 
divorce, the couple still agrees that the embryos should remain 
frozen, however, the party that originally agreed to pay the storage 
fees now wants to split the costs equally. This change of heart does 
not affect the enforcement of the IVF contract because it is not a 
change of heart regarding the ultimate outcome of the embryos, but 
rather a financial obligation of one of the parties. As a result, the 
contract should still be upheld, enforced, and governed by the rules 
of contract law. 
 
 113 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
 114 For an example of a dispute between a couple and an IVF clinic, see 
generally NJ couple sues fertility clinic, saying wrong sperm used to conceive 
child, ABC7 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://abc7ny.com/society/couple-says-fertility-
clinic-used-wrong-sperm-to-conceive-baby/5532537/ [https://perma.cc/2TWH-
D2S4]. 
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Furthermore, because the Contemporaneous Consent Approach 
still honors the principles of contract law, the standard defenses that 
accompany contract law are also available during disputes as 
safeguards to the process. For example, IVF contracts may be 
voided in cases of fraud115 or duress.116 More commonly, an IVF 
contract would be voidable if it goes against public policy.117 
Contracts that address frozen embryo disposition, however, are 
not typical contracts. They have the potential to implicate private, 
familial decisions. Consequently, it is rational that the contract law 
defenses, particularly the public policy defense, are not enough to 
ensure all of the parties’ interests are protected. Generally, relying 
on a public policy defense as the argument in favor of non-
enforcement is a risky matter. The discretion of the court plays a key 
role in determining what does and does not violate public policy.118 
This leaves much room for different courts to come up with different 
rules, thus contributing to the lack of uniformity when a dispute 
arises. This lack of uniformity occurs because judges in different 
jurisdictions may weigh factors differently in determining what 
violates public policy. For example, there is no consensus among 
courts whether forcing parentage on a party by awarding one party 
the embryos over the other party’s objection pursuant to an IVF 
agreement violates public policy. A Texas court in Roman v. 
 
 115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“When A Misrepresentation Makes a Contract Voidable . . .”). 
 116 Id. § 177 (“When Undue Influence Makes a Contract Voidable . . .”). 
 117 Id. § 178 (“When A Term Is Unenforceable On Grounds Of Public Policy 
. . . (1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against 
the enforcement of such terms. (2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of 
a term, account is taken of (a) the parties’ justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture 
that would result if enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public interest 
in the enforcement of the particular term. (3) In weighing a public policy against 
enforcement of a term, account is taken of (a) the strength of that policy as 
manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to 
enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct 
involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the 
connection between that misconduct and the term.”). 
 118 Id. 
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Roman119 favored the husband’s right not to procreate, and ordered 
the embryos to be destroyed.120 This court refused to force parentage 
on the husband.121 However, in Terrell v. Torres,122 an Arizona court 
held that the right of a mother to have a child outweighed the right 
of a father not to become a parent, and awarded the mother the 
embryos.123 The Terrell court did not believe forcing parentage on a 
party violates public policy.124 
Additionally, there is no consensus among courts whether 
discarding embryos violates public policy. For example, in 
Louisiana, if an IVF contract called for the destruction of the unused 
embryos or the donation of the embryos to research, a judge would 
determine that the contract violates public policy because it would 
be in direct contravention of the Louisiana statute.125 However, in 
the case of Litowitz v. Litowitz,126 a Washington court held that the 
frozen embryos should be discarded pursuant to the existing IVF 
contract, thus indicating that discarding embryos does not violate 
public policy.127 
Accordingly, there is no absolute certainty how a court will rule 
when the contract law public policy defense is argued because the 
decision is ultimately under the discretion of the court. Thus, the 
contract law public policy defense alone only leads courts further 
away from uniformity in their decisions, leaving parents vulnerable 
to the court’s discretion. 
B. Acknowledging the Potential Change of Heart 
At the time of signing an IVF contract, many couples do not 
contemplate divorce.128 Much can change in the lives of the parties 
 
 119 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 55. 
 122 Terrell v. Torres, 438 P.3d 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2017). 
 126 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 127 Id. at 271. 
 128 See Preville, supra note 33, at 89–90; Mayes, supra note 14 (“When a couple 
comes in for IVF, the last thing they want to think about is divorce or 
separation.”). 
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between the time of freezing the embryos and the court action, 
including the dissolution of their marriage. Parties could have vastly 
different views on the disposition of the embryos at the time of the 
IVF contract enforcement. Thus, it is far more likely one or both of 
the parties will have a change of heart.129 
Under contract law, only intent at the time of the agreement is 
binding.130 Intent at the time of enforcement has no bearing on the 
contract. Because of the unique interests at stake, however, allowing 
a change of heart is more necessary in frozen embryo disposition 
disputes. In practice, the mutual assent of the parties requirement 
necessitates both parties’ agreement to the disposition at the time of 
enforcement before any final disposition of the embryos takes 
place.131 Thus, the court will not enforce the prior agreement if a 
party has a change of heart and no longer agrees to the disposition 
from that prior agreement.132 Neither party is allowed to use the 
frozen embryos, donate the frozen embryos to another patient or to 
research, or destroy the frozen embryos without both the creators of 
the frozen embryos giving contemporaneous mutual consent.133 
Having the additional safeguard of mutual assent of the parties 
at the time of enforcement also acknowledges that IVF contracts 
dealing with the disposition of frozen embryos are not typical 
contracts. IVF contracts have the potential to implicate private, 
familial decisions and views that may drastically change over time. 
There is more at stake in IVF contracts regarding lifechanging 
personal issues, and thus the additional safeguard of mutual assent 
 
 129 See Preville, supra note 33, at 91 (“One study has shown that as many as 
71% of couples change their preferences for disposition from their initial 
preferences before treatment.”); see also Mayes, supra note 14. 
 130 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (“A contract must be so interpreted as to give 
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, 
so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.”); Gould v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, 123 F. Supp. 3d 197 (D. Mass. 2015) (“[t]he requisite intent, for 
an enforceable contract, is the intent to be bound by the contract’s terms at the 
moment of the formation of a contested agreement.”). 
 131 Coleman, supra note 19, at 110. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
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at the time of enforcement should be in place to reflect and protect 
the parties’ potential changed interests and views. 
In fact, many states have enacted statutes which require waiting 
periods for highly emotional, private familial decisions, recognizing 
that views or feelings in these situations can be highly subject to 
change.134 For example, Iowa’s adoption statute provides a seventy-
two-hour waiting period after the birth of a child before biological 
parents may individually release their parental rights.135 These 
statutes which allow for potential changes of heart in highly 
emotional, familial decisions are widespread throughout the United 
States.136 
C. Protecting Procreative Liberty by Preventing Forced 
Parentage 
During a dispute over frozen embryos, multiple complicating 
and competing factors and interests of the parties may be present at 
the time of enforcement. For example, a party may be infertile and 
unable to have any biological children without the frozen embryos137 
or a party may have strong religious views in opposition to 
discarding or donating the embryos.138 While these claims are valid 
and may at first seem to weigh in favor of awarding that party the 
 
 134 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2017) (requiring a five-day waiting 
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental 
rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210, § 2 (2017) (requiring a four-day waiting 
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental 
rights); MINN. STAT. § 259.24 (2017) (requiring a three-day waiting period after 
the birth of a child before parents may relinquish their parental rights). 
 135 IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(g) (2017). 
 136 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2017) (requiring a five-day waiting 
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental 
rights); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 210, § 2 (2017) (requiring a four-day waiting 
period after the birth of the child before parents may relinquish their parental 
rights); MINN. STAT. § 259.24 (2017) (requiring a three-day waiting period after 
the birth of a child before parents may relinquish their parental rights). 
 137 See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 138 See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001). 
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embryos, paramount interests exist: procreative liberty and the right 
to not become a parent.139 
While the right not to become a parent is not a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right,140 there are still areas of life that courts 
are hesitant to reach because they are too personal or private.141 The 
view that the decision to become parents is one of those private, 
personal areas, and should rest solely in the hands of the parties, not 
the courts, has emerged.142 This notion, that parties themselves 
should be the final decision-makers in their own procreation, is 
encompassed by the concept of procreative liberty.143 A court 
forcing parentage on a party is in direct contravention of the concept 
of procreative liberty because forced parentage takes the decision-
making power away from the parties and leaves it to the discretion 
of the court. Even if a party is able to legally and financially absolve 
himself or herself from any responsibility toward the potential child, 
thus avoiding legal parentage,144 a court awarding a party the frozen 
 
 139 For a discussion on the right not to become a parent as an inalienable right, 
compare Coleman, supra note 19 with Pachman, supra note 49. 
 140 For a discussion on why the right not to become a parent is not a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right, see generally, Pachman, supra note 
49. 
 141 Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 642 (1889) (“It is of the genius of our laws, 
as well as of our civilization, that matters pertaining so directly and exclusively 
to the home, and its value as such, and which are so generally susceptible of 
regulation and control by those influences which surround it, are not to become 
matters of public concern or inquiry.”); Doe v. Doe, 365 Mass. 556 (1974) 
(holding that there is a hesitancy for courts to become involved in intimate 
questions of family life). 
 142 See generally Christina C. Lawrence, Procreative Liberty and the 
Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the 
Disposition of Frozen Preembryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721 (2002) 
(proposing an inalienable rights approach to IVF contract interpretation and 
enforcement). 
 143 For a more in-depth discussion on procreative liberty and forced parentage, 
see generally Coleman, supra note 19; see also Lawrence, supra note 142. 
 144 Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and the Absurdity 
of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 615 (1998) (“[i]f the non-
consenting party simply wants to avoid having custody or financial responsibility, 
a court could convert the party’s status from being the parent of a frozen embryo 
to being an ‘egg donor’ or ‘sperm donor’ without the custody or financial 
obligations of parenthood”). 
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embryos over the other party’s objections still forces biological 
parentage on a party.145 
Both the Pure Contractual Approach and the Balancing Test 
Approach have the potential to implicate a party’s procreative 
liberty by forcing parentage. While courts implementing the Pure 
Contractual Approach have typically held that forcing parentage on 
a party would violate public policy,146 not all Pure Contractual 
Approach courts follow the same logic, particularly because the 
public policy defense is so discretionary as discussed earlier. For 
example, in Szafranski v. Dunston,147 the Illinois Appellate Court 
enforced a frozen embryo oral contract between Jacob Szafranski 
and his ex-girlfriend Karla Dunston.148 Karla had been recently 
diagnosed with cancer when she decided to begin the IVF and 
cryopreservation process with Jacob.149 Both parties knew the 
chemotherapy treatments would make her infertile.150 The couple 
had an attorney draft an agreement awarding Karla the use of the 
embryos, but the couple never signed the agreement.151 At the time 
of the dispute, Jacob no longer wished to become a parent and 
wanted to bar Karla from using their embryos.152 The court, 
however, held an oral contract existed between the parties.153 
Despite Jacob’s change of heart, the court enforced their oral 
contract by allowing Karla use of the embryos.154 Thus, this 
implementation of the Pure Contractual Approach implicated 
procreative liberty by forcing parentage. 
 
 145 For a discussion on the impacts of forced biological parentage, see Coleman, 
supra note 19, at 81–82. 
 146 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y. 1998) (favoring one party’s 
right not to procreate); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d. 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) 
(favoring one party’s right not to procreate). 
 147 Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 148 Id. at 1164. 
 149 Id. at 1136. 
 150 Id. at 1136. 
 151 Id. at 1139. 
 152 Id. at 1141. 
 153 Id. at 1149. 
 154 Id. at 1164. 
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The Balancing Test Approach has also implicated the right not 
to become a parent in practice. For example, in Reber v. Reiss155 the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court weighed Andrea Lynn Reiss’s right to 
have a biological child over her ex-husband, Bret Reber’s right not 
to become a parent.156 Reiss and Reber began their IVF and 
cryopreservation journey when Reiss was first diagnosed with 
cancer, and Reiss began chemotherapy treatments that would make 
her infertile.157 Over two years later, Reber filed for divorce and 
wanted the embryos destroyed because he no longer wished to 
become a parent.158 The court used the Balancing Test Approach and 
determined Reiss’s right to have biological children outweighed 
Reber’s right not to become a parent.159 Thus, this implementation 
of the Balancing Test Approach implicated the ex-husband’s 
procreative liberty by forcing parentage. 
The emotionally charged facts of both Szafranski v. Dunston160 
and Reber v. Reiss161 may seem to weigh in favor of the Pure 
Contractual Approach or the Balancing Test Approach because the 
outcomes appear justified. The main inquiry, however, is not 
whether the courts were justified in their decisions, but whether 
courts generally should have the power to implicate procreative 
liberty by forcing parentage on a party. 
When implementing the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, 
a change of heart by one of the parties ceases a court’s ability to 
enforce any prior agreement.162 Thus, this approach will not infringe 
upon procreative liberty through a court forcing parentage on a 
party. This lack of enforceability of the contract, however, does not 
always mean the party who wants the embryos in one of these highly 
emotional situations has lost his or her ability to ever be awarded the 
embryos. Under the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, the 
parties are still free to come to a subsequent mutual agreement that 
 
 155 See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 156 Id. at 1141. 
 157 Id. at 1132. 
 158 Id. at 1133. 
 159 Id. at 1142. 
 160 Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 161 Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 162 Coleman, supra note 19, at 110. 
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awards one party the embryos in those more emotionally charged 
cases. In this situation, though, a court enforcing this mutual 
agreement is not forcing parentage on a party because it is the couple 
who has jointly decided to award the embryos to one party. 
D. Applying a Tested Approach 
The final strength of this approach is that it has been tested. 
Although first proposed in the literature,163 this approach came to 
fruition in Massachusetts in 2000,164 in Iowa in 2003,165 and in 
Missouri in 2016166 through their state courts. Many of the 
approach’s strengths and weaknesses have been evidenced through 
case law in these states.167 For example, one of the issues arising 
from the Contemporaneous Consent Approach is the possibility that 
the embryos will remain in storage indefinitely.168 Because of the 
high storage costs of frozen embryos, a question may arise 
concerning who is responsible for paying these storage fees. A court 
in Iowa, however, addressed this issue and established a solution 
when implementing this approach in In re Marriage of Witten.169 
The court held that the party with the change of heart, thus 
responsible for the potentially indefinite storage, would also be 
responsible for the fees associated with storage.170 
While many scholars have suggested novel statutory approaches 
to address frozen embryo disposition,171 the Contemporaneous 
 
 163 See generally Coleman, supra note 19 (first proposing the requirement of 
contemporaneous mutual consent of the parties at the time of IVF contract 
enforcement). 
 164 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 165 See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 166 McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 167 See id.; A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); McQueen v. Gadberry, 
507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 168 Potentially indefinite storage is discussed further in Section IV. 
 169 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 170 Id. at 783. 
 171 See, e.g., Zizzi, supra note 22 (proposing a state statute requiring parties to 
enter into contracts before beginning IVF and courts should enforce those 
contracts); El-Zein, supra note 13 (suggesting parties obtain outside, separate 
counsel to create IVF contracts and courts should enforce those contracts); 
Frazier, supra note 13 (suggesting keeping embryo disputes out of courtrooms). 
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Consent Approach has already been applied in courts and proven 
effective in application.172 States that have yet to establish an 
approach do not need grapple with the complications and obstacles 
that accompany entirely novel solutions to the same degree because 
examples of successful application of this approach are evidenced 
in the case law of states already implementing the approach. 
VI. DRAWBACKS OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT 
APPROACH AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
While the Contemporaneous Consent Approach maintains 
additional safeguards to the process, courts will have to address the 
drawbacks to the approach and certain situations in which further 
safeguards to the approach must be present. First, with this 
approach, there is the chance the parties may never come to a mutual 
decision.173 These disputes arise because the parties cannot agree on 
the disposition of their embryos. Thus, requiring an agreement 
before any final disposition of the embryos may be ordered by a 
court could result in never reaching any conclusion for the 
embryos.174 
First, the potential for indefinite storage may suggest the 
embryos will exist in “legal limbo” indefinitely. There are many 
incentives throughout the process, however, that make it likely the 
parties will to come to a mutual decision. Primarily, most parties 
prefer to have a quicker divorce and not prolong the process.175 
Further, many IVF clinics have policies that, after a certain point of 
non-use, frozen embryos will be thawed and discarded, or donated 
to research for administrative and feasibility reasons.176 Finally, 
storage costs range between $300 to $1,200 a year.177 Thus, in the 
 
 172 See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 
672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
 173 Amanda West, Reproductive Freedom or Forced Procreation: An Analysis 
of Minnesota Statutory Law Dealing with the Parentage of Frozen Embryos after 
Divorce, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 259, 269–70 (2013). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See Preville, supra note 33, at 91. 
 176 John A. Robertson, Ethical and legal issues in cryopreservation of human 
embryos, 47 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 371, 375 (1987). 
 177 See 2 Dana Shilling & Barbara Detkin, L. Desk Book § 14.11 (2019). 
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absence of a mutual agreement, leaving the embryos stored 
indefinitely may not be the most cost-efficient option for couples 
already going through an expensive divorce. Not only do these 
factors possibly create an end point for the dispute, but they also 
create incentives for parties to come to a mutual agreement. 
Second, another drawback that accompanies potentially 
indefinite storage occurs if one party dies during the time of 
indefinite storage. On one hand, the surviving party could argue that 
his or her rights now outweigh any of the rights of the deceased, or 
that the deceased no longer has rights in the frozen embryos.178 On 
the other hand, the estate of the deceased would argue in favor of 
respecting the last wishes of the deceased.179 The latter argument 
most aligns with the understanding of wills, intestate succession, 
and posthumous procreation, which maintains that the deceased 
party’s wishes should be respected and honored post-mortem.180 If a 
court chooses to respect the last wishes of the deceased, the court 
may also allow the surviving party to override the last wishes of the 
deceased upon the showing of extreme, or extraordinary changed 
circumstances.181 
The third and final drawback of the approach is that parties 
entering into IVF contracts may rely on their IVF contracts, making 
major life decisions on the assumption the contract will be enforced 
by a court. For example, a couple may agree to freeze their embryos 
so the woman can focus on her career at that time, but still have the 
opportunity to have biological children at a later time. The couple 
then signs a contract stating she will be awarded the embryos in the 
event of a divorce. Thus, the woman proceeds with her plans of 
pursuing her career with the confidence, should anything happen, 
she would be awarded the embryos and still have the opportunity to 
have biological children of her own. Years later, at the time of the 
divorce, however, the husband has a change of heart and no longer 
wants his wife to be awarded the embryos. The Contemporaneous 
 
 178 John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1047 
(1994). 
 179 Coleman, supra note 19, at 113. 
 180 Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous 
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 943 (1997). 
 181 Coleman, supra note 19, at 114. 
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Consent Approach would honor this change of heart, and not force 
parentage on the husband despite the contract. In this situation, 
however, the woman made major life decisions relying on the 
enforceability of the contract. The notions of fairness and equity in 
contract law suggest the woman’s reliance should be dispositive to 
the court, and the contract should be enforced if no other remedy is 
appropriate.182 Under the Contemporaneous Consent Approach, 
however, the woman’s reliance has no effect on the enforceability 
of the IVF contract. While there are no perfect solutions to this 
drawback, there is an option to mitigate some of the consequences 
that accompany reliance on IVF contracts. 
To address this drawback, under the Contemporaneous Consent 
Approach, drafters of the IVF contract should make parties aware 
that the disposition of the frozen embryo provision in their IVF 
contract may be unenforceable at the time of divorce. Placing 
unenforceable clauses in contracts is often done in other family law 
contracts.183 For example, parties often place child custody 
provisions in prenuptial and separation agreements despite their 
inability to be enforced by a court.184 In practice, drafters of the 
contract are required to put the parties on notice that if a dispute 
arises, the provisions will not be enforced despite those provisions 
being in the contract. This unenforceability principle can be applied 
 
 182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance (1) A promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the 
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enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise.”). 
 183 See Ariel Baniowski, Unenforceable Custody and Support Provisions in 
Separation Agreements, LIVESAY & MYERS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.livesaymyers.com/unenforceable-custody-support-provisions-
separation-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/28JK-QSR6] (“[A] provision in a 
separation agreement may state that ‘In the event either of the parents of the 
children were to die, the surviving grandparents shall receive visitation with the 
children every other weekend.’ Unfortunately, such a provision would be 
unenforceable.”). 
 184 Id. (“[A] provision [in a prenuptial agreement] may read ‘In the event the 
mother [the primary physical custodian] moves more than 30 miles from the 
father’s current residence [the minority custodian], primary physical custody shall 
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to IVF contracts so that any reliance on the IVF contract would be 
unjustified. Thus, parties would be less likely to make major life 
decisions on the assumption the contract would be enforced at the 
time of divorce. 
Although the Contemporaneous Consent Approach has its 
drawbacks, it is still the appropriate method of IVF contract 
interpretation and enforcement for states still looking for guidance. 
Since the approach is only implemented in a few states, there have 
not been many opportunities for courts to address all of the 
drawbacks that come with the approach. As more states adopt this 
approach, however, many of the drawbacks listed above may be 
encountered. Once these issues arise with higher frequency, it will 
allow courts to develop creative solutions such as the proposed 
solutions above for other courts to follow. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Assisted Reproductive Technology has rapidly expanded in 
ways that many courts are continuing to grapple with. The legal and 
ethical implications of ART are vast, and courts have struggled to 
remain uniform in their decisions during frozen embryo disputes. 
Although many states have addressed through case law or statute 
what will happen during a frozen embryo disposition dispute, many 
states have yet to address the issue at all. This lack of clarity and 
uniformity leaves couples pursuing IVF in those states vulnerable 
and subject to significant uncertainty regarding the disposition of 
their frozen embryos, even when they sign contracts. 
States looking for guidance should adopt the Contemporaneous 
Consent Approach. This approach is the most protective of all of the 
competing interests at stake because it offers an additional safeguard 
to the Pure Contractual Approach, honors parties’ potential for a 
change of heart, and protects the procreative liberty of the parties. 
Although the approach has its weaknesses, as more states adopt this 
method of IVF contract interpretation and enforcement, courts will 
be able to develop creative solutions to mitigate many of the 
drawbacks. All things considered, with the Contemporaneous 
Consent Approach, couples pursuing IVF can feel confident that 
their contracts will be honored, absent a change of heart, while their 
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rights and interests are protected throughout their entire IVF 
journeys. 
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Appendix A: United States Map of Judicial IVF Contract 
Interpretation and Enforcement Approaches185 
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